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Environmental Statutes That Control U.S.
Agency Projects Abroad: The Endangered
Species Act and Defenders of Wildlife v.
Lujan
[A]lthough the Endangered Species Act came into existence with no
clearly articulated rationale, and although the need for one was initially
avoided because of the generality of the act, day-to-day implementation
in a complex political and bureaucratic milieu has progressively de-
manded decisions regarding its most important goals.*
INTRODUCTION
Over the last several years, 40 to 50 million acres of tropical
forest, an area the size of Washington State, has been destroyed
each year.' The timber from these forests is cut for its commer-
cial value and existing vegetation is burned in order to clear land
for agriculture and other development. 2 These clear-cutting and
burning activities destroy the natural habitat of uncounted num-
bers of plant and animal species.3 Accelerated habitat depletion
is driving indigenous species of plants and animals to extinction
at an alarming rate.4 This loss of species is not confined to the
* B. NORTON, WHY PRESERVE NATURAL VARIETY? 5-6 (1987).
Shabecoff, Loss of Tropical Forests is Found Much Worse Than Was Thought,
N.Y. Times, June 8, 1991 at Al, col. 1 (citing figures prepared in collaboration with the
United Nations by the World Resources Institute) [hereinafter Shabecoff]. See gener-
ally, WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE, WORLD RESOURCES 1990-1991 (1991) [hereinafter
WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE]. Satellite data covering the 1987 dry season in Brazil
showed that the Amazon rain forest was being cleared far faster than previously thought.
Eight million hectares, an area about the size of Austria, were burned there in 1987 alone
with no signs of a decreased rate seen for the future. L. BROWN, STATE OF THE WORLD 4
(1989).
2 See Shabecoff, supra note 1.
' Tropical forests harbor at least 2.5 species of plants and animals, and perhaps
many more. Schmidt, Ecodevelopment: Using, Not Losing, the Rain Forest, Chicago
Tribune, May 13, 1991, at 15, zone C.
' The abundance and complexity of ecosystems, species, and genetic types defy ef-
forts to inventory and directly assess the scope of the problem. As a result, an accurate
estimate of the rate of loss of species is impossible. Most scientists and conservationists
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rain forests, but is occurring in most regions of the world.5
The rapid decline in biological diversity6 that accompanies
habitat depletion is a matter of grave concern. While the devel-
opment of land can provide considerable benefits when the
land's capability to sustain growing communities is preserved,
compelling evidence indicates that the rapid and unintended re-
duction in biological diversity is undermining society's capability
to respond to future needs.7 For example, the loss of species de-
creases our ability to identify plants that may be used to de-
velop disease-resistant crops, new textiles, necessary medicines
and potential cures.' As a result, the genetic storehouse of the
working in this area believe that the problem has reached crisis proportions. OFFICE OF
TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, CONGRESSIONAL BOARD OF THE 100TH CONGRESS, TEcINOLOGIES
TO MAINTAIN BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY 3-4 (1987) [hereinafter TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT].
I See, e.g., TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, supra note 4, at 3. Clear-cutting and burning
are not the only activities causing habitat depletion and the resulting loss in species. The
construction of enormous hydro-electric dams, for example, inundate vast regions up-
stream of the dam and dry out equally vast areas downstream. The upstream flooding
can extinguish entire species and the downstream decrease in water supply similarly
makes it impossible for indigenous species of plants and animals in the geographic region
to survive. See generally, L. BROWN, supra note 1, at 21-76.
6 The term biological diversity has been defined as follows:
Biological diversity refers to the variety and variability among living organisms
and the ecological [systems] in which they occur. Diversity can be defined as the
number of different items and their relative frequency. For biological diversity,
these items are organized at many levels, ranging from complete ecosystems to the
chemical structures that are the molecular basis of heredity. Thus, the term en-
compasses different ecosystems, species, genes, and their relative abundance.
TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, supra note 4, at 3. For example, a landscape interspersed with
croplands, grasslands, and woodlands is more biologically diverse than a landscape with
most of the woodlands converted to croplands. Likewise a rangeland with 100 species of
annual and perennial grasses and shrubs has more diversity than the same rangeland
after heavy grazing has eliminated or greatly reduced the perennial grass species. Id.
TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, supra note 4, at 3. See generally L. BROWN, supra note
1; WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE, supra note 1.
s Loss of tropical rain forests and deserts, which harbor genetically diverse vegeta-
tion, are of particular concern. TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, supra note 4, at 4. New meth-
ods of manipulating genetic material enable the isolation and extraction of a desired
gene from one plant or organism and its insertion into another. Loss of diversity, there-
fore, may undermine societies' realization of this technology's potential. Id. See also
Osava, Agriculture: Genetic Erosion Threatens Food Production, Inter Press Service,
June 1, 1991. The technological opportunities regarding crops are or have been abun-
dant. Today, for example, we largely rely on six species of grain for food. The rain forests
of the world contain another sixty, at least. See 135 CONG. REC. H 7,150 (daily ed. Oct.
18, 1989) (statement of Rep. Porter). In particular, an ancient wild relative of corn found
in Mexico could be worth billions of dollars to corn growers around the world because of
its resistance to seven major diseases plaguing domesticated corn. TECHNOLOGY ASSESS-
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planet as well as the aesthetic beauty of vast, pristine regions are
diminished through the rapid reduction in biological diversity.
During the 1970s and 1980s, the international community
awakened to the threat posed by the continued, unchecked de-
cline in biological diversity.' Through cooperative efforts, an
emerging body of general international principles has been de-
veloped. Under these principles, the United States has a duty,
along with other states, to protect biological diversity
worldwide. 10
While preliminary steps were being taken in the interna-
tional community, the United States took a vanguard position at
home and, in 1973, Congress responded to the worldwide decline
in biological diversity by enacting the Endangered Species Act
(ESA)." The United States Supreme Court hailed the ESA as
"the most comprehensive legislation for the preservation of en-
dangered species ever enacted by any nation."'"
The ESA imposes special duties on United States federal
agencies to ensure that agency activities will not contribute to
the further depletion of endangered species. The authority for
this check on agency activity is found in section 7 of the ESA.' 3
Section 7 imposes a duty upon all federal agencies to "[i]nsure
that any action authorized, funded, or carried out by such
agency . . . is not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of
any endangered species or threatened species. ,," Because of
MENT, supra note 4, at 5.
Regarding medicines, loss of plant species could mean the loss of billions of dollars
in potential plant-derived pharmaceutical products. About 25 percent of the number of
prescription drugs in the United States are derived from plants. TECHNOLOGY ASSESS-
MENT, supra note 4, at 4. Consequences to humans of loss of potential medicines have
impacts that go beyond economic benefits. For example, alkaloids from the rosy periwin-
kle flower, found in Madagascar, are currently used in the successful treatment of several
forms of cancer, including Hodgkin's disease and childhood leukemia. Id.
' See infra notes 147-148 and accompanying text.
10 Id.
"I Endangered Species Act of 1973, Pub. L. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (codified at 16
U.S.C. § 1531 (1988)). The underlying purpose of the ESA is "to provide a means
whereby the ecosystems upon which endangered species and threatened species depend
may be conserved . . . and to take such steps as may be appropriate to achieve the
purposes of the treaties and conventions set forth .. " Id. at § 1531(b).
"S Tennessee Valley Authority, Inc. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 180 (1978).
13 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (1988).
14 Id. at § 1536(a)(2).
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the general nature of the language in this provision, the issue of
whether section 7 reaches federal agency actions carried out in
foreign countries has been the subject of controversy since 1976,
when preliminary regulatory guidelines were promulgated. 15
From 1976 to 1986, ESA regulations, promulgated by the De-
partment of Interior, interpreted section 7 as applying to United
States projects carried out in foreign countries.'" For example,
the Army Corps of Engineers would be under a duty to comply
with section 7 before it constructed a dam overseas or undertook
a large-scale agricultural project involving deforestation in sub-
tropical regions.
In October of 1986, the Secretary of the Department of In-
terior (Secretary) promulgated new regulations eliminating the
application of section 7 to federal agency actions carried out in
foreign countries. 17 These 1986 regulations were challenged in
Defenders of Wildlife v. Lujan.18 In 1990, the United States
1" See infra notes 84-86 and accompanying text.
" The language of the original regulations required "every Federal agency to insure
that its activities or programs in the United States, upon the high seas, and in foreign
countries will not jeopardize the continued existence of a listed species." 43 Fed. Reg.
874 (1978) (codified at 50 C.F.R. § 402) (emphasis added).
"7 The new rule, promulgated in 1986, cut back the scope of the consultation re-
quirement within section 7 in two ways. First, the phrase "and in foreign countries" was
struck from the provision defining the scope of section 7:
Section 7(a)(2) of the Act requires every Federal agency, in consultation with and
with the assistance of the Secretary, to insure that any action it authorizes, funds
or carries out, in the United States or upon the high seas is not likely to jeopard-
ize the continued existence of any listed species or results in the destruction or
adverse modification of critical habitat.
51 Fed. Reg. 19,957 (1986) (codified at 50 C.F.R. § 402.01) (emphasis added). Compare
with the 1978 regulation, supra note 16. Second, the term "action" as it appears in sec-
tion 7 (e.g. "federal agency action") was assigned a regulatory definition for the first time
in the 1986 regulation. "Action" was defined to include only agency actions within the
United States, its territorial waters, or on the outer continental shelf:
"Action" means all activities or programs of any kind authorized, funded or car-
ried out, in whole or in part, by Federal agencies in the United States or upon the
high seas. Examples include, but are not limited to: (a) actions intended to con-
serve listed species or their habitat; (b) the promulgation of regulations, (c) the
granting of licenses, contracts, leases, easements, rights-of-way, permits, or grants-
in-aid; or (d) actions directly or indirectly causing modifications to the land, water
or air.
51 Fed. Reg. 19,957 (1986) (codified at 50 C.F.R. § 402.02) (emphasis added).
"S Defenders of Wildlife v. Hodel, 658 F. Supp. 43 (D. Minn. 1987) (holding that
plaintiffs did not have standing), rev'd, 851 F.2d 1035 (8th Cir. 1988) (holding that plain-
tiffs did have standing) [hereinafter Defenders I], on remand, 707 F. Supp. 1982 (D.
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol3/iss1/11
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Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit upheld the district court
decision which ordered the Secretary to rescind the 1986 regula-
tions and to promulgate new regulations reinstating the applica-
tion of section 7 to federal agencies' projects in foreign coun-
tries.19 Certiorari was granted by the United States Supreme
Court in May, 1991 on the procedural issue of standing and on
the merits20
Part I of this note provides an overview of the ESA. Part II
presents the procedural history of Defenders of Wildlife v.
Lujan. Part III provides the holding of the 1990 Eighth Circuit
opinion. After discussing the Eighth Circuit's holding, Part IV
comments on the domestic significance of the holding and com-
pares the language of the ESA and the controversy over its ex-
traterritorial application in pari materia with the language and
history of a similar provision in the National Environmental
Policy Act2" (NEPA). This comparison reveals an inconsistent
United States foreign policy agenda regarding global environ-
mental conservation and the author posits that this may be
partly responsible for the gross lack of compliance with section 7
of the ESA. It is argued that, regardless of how the United
States Supreme Court decides this case, legislative amendments,
regulatory revisions and judicial intervention will continue to
create, in effect, a piecemeal environmental foreign policy for
the United States. While an evolution in statutory interpretation
may be anticipated for most statutes, the evolution of environ-
mental provisions applicable to agency actions in foreign coun-
tries is awkwardly filling a gap in United States foreign policy. If
a clear policy were articulated by the State Department, one ex-
Minn. 1989) (holding that plaintiffs had standing and that the 1986 regulations violated
the ESA), aff'd sub nom., Defenders of Wildlife v. Lujan, 911 F.2d 117 (8th Cir. 1990)
[hereinafter Defenders II], cert. granted sub nom. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, U.S.
(May, 1991). The defendant in this case is the Secretary of the Interior. In 1990, Secre-
tary Manuel Lujan replaced former Secretary Donald P. Hodel.
Because the original proceeding in 1987 and the first appeal to the Eighth Circuit in
1988 (Defenders 1) only addressed the issue of standing, they will not be analyzed at
length. Instead, this note will focus on the 1989 remand to the District Court and the
second appeal to the Eighth Circuit in 1990 (Defenders H), which rendered judgments
on the merits.
19 Defenders H, 911 F.2d 117, 125 (8th Cir. 1990).
20 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, - U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 2008 (1991).
2 National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1988).
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pressing both the rationale for United States conservation ef-
forts abroad and the priority to be given to such efforts, the va-
rious environmental statutes calling for agency responsibility
abroad would grow to reflect a more systematic approach to en-
vironmental degradation. Clearer policy decisions from the Ex-
ecutive would also help to shake the inertia of noncompliance
currently suffered by these statutory provisions. Part IV also as-
sesses how the holding in Defenders supports the duty of the
United States under international principles to apply the ESA
to federal actions carried out in foreign countries and identifies
the advantages that such federal statutory provisions have over
purely international legal mechanisms in dealing with global en-
vironmental degradation.
I. OVERVIEW OF THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT AND SECTION 7
The Endangered Species Act (ESA)22 was enacted in 1973
to limit the extinction of endangered plant and animal species
caused by economic growth and development 23 and by the com-
mercial trading of animal and plant parts.2 ' The "findings" set
forth in the ESA convey the values Congress sought to affirm:
The Congress finds and declares that
(3) these species . . . are of esthetic, ecological, educational,
historical, recreational, and scientific value to the Nation and its
people;
(4) the United States has pledged itself as a sovereign state
in the international community to conserve to the extent practi-
cable the various species of fish or wildlife and plants facing
extinction. 25
Using a sweeping approach, the ESA imposes duties on a
range of potential United States actors: First, the Secretary is
required to identify2" and list 27 threatened and endangered spe-
"' Endangered Species Act of 1973, Pub. L. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (codified at 16
U.S.C. § 1531 (1988)).
23 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (1988). See supra note 11 for the pertinent text of § 1531(b).
2, See id. at §§ 1538(c)(1), (c)(2)(D), (d)(1).
" Id. at § 1531(a).
1 "The Secretary shall by regulation promulgated in accordance with subsection (b)
of this section determine whether any species is an endangered species or a threatened
species. ... Id. at § 1533(a).
[Vol. 3:363
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cies23 worldwide; second, commercial traders and buyers of en-
dangered species parts are prohibited from carrying on such
trading and buying;29 and third, in section 7, federal agencies are
required to insure that their projects and other actions are not
likely to jeopardize the continued existence of endangered
species.3°
Focusing on section 7, federal agencies fulfill their require-
ment under section 7 by consulting with the Fish and Wildlife
Service (FWS), an arm of the Department of the Interior, if they
have evidence that their projects may threaten endangered spe-
cies."1 This requirement to consult with FWS is the linchpin of
section 7. Through consultation, an agency is held responsible to
ensure that its actions or funding decisions are not likely to
jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered species or
"' "The Secretary of the Interior shall publish in the Federal Register a list of all
species determined by him or the Secretary of Commerce to be endangered species and a
list of all species determined by him or the Secretary of Commerce to be threatened
species." Id. at § 1533(c).
8 Endangered species are defined as "any species which is in danger of extinction
throughout all or a significant portion of its range .. " Id. at § 1532(6). Threatened
species are defined as "any species which is likely to become an endangered species
within the foreseeable future throughout all or a significant portion of its range." Id. at §
1532(20). The list of endangered and threatened species is included in the regulations to
section 4, which are found at 50 C.F.R. § 17.11 (1990). It contains species of animals and
plants found in the United States and in foreign countries and includes species that
migrate between countries and continents. Id. As of May 1989, 507 of the 1,046 listed
species were found outside of the United States. Defenders II, 911 F.2d 117, 123 (8th
Cir. 1990). In addition, there are 71 listed species whose ranges include both the United
States and foreign countries. Id. The list includes the known general distribution of each
species within its historic range or habitat. 50 C.F.R. § 17.11 (1990). If an individual of a
species is found outside of its historic range, the ESA is nonetheless to be applied: The
regulations to section 4 state that the prohibitions in the ESA "apply to all individuals of
the species, wherever found." Id. at § 17.11(e) (1990).
i' See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1538(c)(1), (c)(2)(D), (d)(1) (1988).
Id. at § 1536(a)(2). The duty imposed upon federal agencies stems from one of the
major policy objectives of the ESA, which requires "every federal agency to implement
its full authority to conserve both endangered and threatened species." Id. at 9
1531(c)(1).
The directive to consult with the Secretary provides in pertinent part:
Each Federal agency shall confer with the Secretary on any agency action which is
likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any species proposed to be listed
under section 1533 of this title or result in the destruction or adverse modification
of critical habitat proposed to be designated for such species.
16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(4) (1988).
1991]
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threatened species." After an agency begins the consultation
process, FWS informs the agency of the endangered or
threatened species that inhabit the area where the proposed ac-
tion will occur.3 FWS concludes the consultation process by is-
suing a "jeopardy" or "no jeopardy" opinion that projects
whether or not the action will have an adverse impact on listed
endangered or threatened species. 34 If a "no jeopardy" opinion is
issued, the federal agency may proceed with its action or offer of
funds without further duty to consult under the ESA. If a "jeop-
ardy" opinion is issued, it must include alternative measures the
federal agency may take to lessen or eliminate the harm the pro-
ject would otherwise cause to the endangered species inhabiting
32 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (1988).
3- 50 C.F.R. §§ 402.02(d), 402.12. See generally 50 C.F.R. § 402 (provides the consul-
tation procedures).
31 Section 7(b)(3)(A) provides that:
Promptly after conclusion of consultation under paragraph (2) or (3) of subsection
(a) of this section, the secretary shall provide to the Federal agency and the appli-
cant, if any, a written statement setting forth the Secretary's opinion, and a sum-
mary of the information on which the opinion is based, detailing how the agency
action affects the species or its critical habitat. If jeopardy or adverse modification
is found, the Secretary shall suggest those reasonable and prudent alternatives
which he believed would not violate subsection (a)(2) of this section and can be
taken by the Federal agency or applicant in implementing the agency action.
16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(3)(A) (1988).
If a "jeopardy" opinion is issued, further discussion with FWS is required under the
regulations to discuss the implementation of alternatives. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 402.15, 402.16
(1990). The "jeopardy" or "no jeopardy" opinions may either be formal or informal.
Informal consultations are preliminary, optional inquiries (often made by telephone) as
to whether listed species inhabit a particular area. Provisions for informal consultations
are found at 50 C.F.R. § 402.13 (1986). Through 1984, FWS records indicate that 20,375
informal consultations or about 3,000 per year were initiated by various federal agencies.
FWS Div. Hab. Cons., Br. Fed. Act. files, Arlington, VA (File Code: 3.7.1 Consultation
Statistics).
Once the agency has had meaningful consultation with the Secretary concerning ac-
tions which may affect endangered species, the final decision of whether or not to pro-
ceed with the action lies with the agency. National Wildlife Federation v. Coleman, 529
F.2d 359, rehearing denied 532 F.2d 1375, cert. denied 429 U.S. 979 (1976). See also
Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 534 F.2d 1289 (8th Cir. 1976). However, if the Secretary's opin-
ion contains a "jeopardy" finding, failure by the agency to implement any mitigating
measures may be deemed a violation of the ESA. See 50 C.F.R. § 402.15 (1990). It may
be difficult to convince a court that an agency refusing to take feasible measures to miti-
gate harm is nonetheless "insuring" that its action "is not likely to jeopardize the contin-
ued existence of any endangered species or threatened species or result in the destruc-
tion or adverse modification of habitat of such" species. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (1988).
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol3/iss1/11
DEFENDERS v. LUJAN
the project area.35
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF Defenders of Wildlife v. Lujan
In 1986, Defenders of Wildlife, Friends of Animals and their
Environment, and the Humane Society (Defenders) filed suit in
the Minnesota District Court against the Secretary of the De-
partment of Interior (Secretary) in order to challenge the 1986
regulations to section 7.86 In the initial proceedings, Defenders
claimed that the Secretary's 1986 regulations violated the ESA
by eliminating the extraterritorial reach of section 7.37 The dis-
trict court dismissed that action for lack of subject matter juris-
diction and ruled that Defenders lacked standing to bring the
action.38 On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit,39 the court reversed and remanded finding
that Defenders had standing to challenge the regulations.40
On remand, the district court addressed the merits of the
case for the first time.4 ' The court granted Defender's motion for
summary judgment on the issue of whether the 1986 regulations
contradicted section 7 of the ESA. 42 The court adopted the stan-
dard of review cited by the Secretary. Under this analysis, envi-
ronmental statutes are presumed to have domestic scope unless
a broader scope is expressly stated in the plain language of the
statute.4 The court found the general, all-inclusive language of
3 Id.
3 Defenders of Wildlife v. Hodel, 658 F. Supp. 43 (D. Minn. 1987).
:7 Id.
38 Id. at 48.
Defenders I, 851 F.2d 1035 (8th Cir. 1988).
40 Id. at 1045. In Defenders I, the majority opinion noted that Defenders had al-
leged specific projects in foreign countries, which members had visited, that were in-
creasing the rate of extinction of endangered species. Id. The court's holding that De-
fenders had standing was based on two grounds. First, the court found that this sort of
interest "will support standing when an organizational plaintiff alleges that its members
use the area and will be adversely affected." Id. at 1040 (citations omitted). Second, the
majority found that Defenders had pleaded a procedural harm traceable to the Secre-
tary's failure to require consultation for projects in foreign countries, and that a decree
reversing that interpretation would redress Defenders' injuries. Id. at 1041-44.
Defenders of Wildlife v. Hodel, 707 F. Supp. 1082, 1084 (D. Minn. 1989).
4 Id. at 1086.
4 Id. at 1084. The presumption of domestic application is expressed in an environ-
mental case in United States v. Mitchell, 553 F.2d 996 (5th Cir. 1977), which is cited by
the Secretary as authority for its argument as to the appropriate standard of review. Id.
1991]
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section 7 to be compelling evidence of Congress' intent to apply
section 7 to agency projects in foreign countries." The court as-
serted that:
[t]he language and mandate is all inclusive; it could not be more
broad. Consultation must occur whenever an action endangers
any endangered species. Endangered species exist outside the
boundaries of the United States and high seas, therefore, consul-
tation must occur if an action in a foreign land affects an endan-
gered or threatened species there.'
The court acknowledged that the use of all-inclusive language in
the statute, by itself, is not enough to demonstrate the specific
and clear intent of Congress. " In addition, the court based its
finding on the legislative history of the ESA and the appearance
throughout the ESA of an overall international concern."7
Some emphasis was given to the amendments later made to
section 7 following the promulgation of the 1978 regulations.
These amendments left the relevant portion of the consultation
provision untouched.48 The district court characterized Con-
gress' reaffirmation of the consultation provision as a "stamp of
" The court found the all-inclusive language of section 7 to be the most compelling
evidence of Congress' intent to apply this provision to federal agency actions abroad:
The court finds that the ESA plainly states that federal agencies are required to
consult with the Secretary regarding projects in foreign countries. Congress' clear
intent that this is so can, for the most part, be determined without resort to legis-
lative history. Section 1536 clearly states that each federal agency must consult
with the Secretary regarding any action which could jeopardize any endangered or
threatened species.
Id. at 1085.
11 Defenders of Wildlife v. Hodel, 707 F. Supp. 1084, 1084-85 (D. Minn. 1989) (cita-
tions omitted) (emphasis in original).
46 Id. at 1085 (citing Mitchell, 553 F.2d at 1003).
' Id. at 1085.
48 Id. at 1085-86. The court cited the Conference Report on these amendments,
which indicated that no substantive changes were intended for the consultation
provisions:
The conferees adopted Senate language creating a new section 7(a), which essen-
tially restates section 7 of existing law, and outlines the responsibilities of the
Secretary and other Federal agencies for protecting endangered species. . . .The
Conferees felt that the Senate provision by retaining existing law, was preferable
since regulations governing section 7 are now familiar to most Federal agencies
and have received substantial judicial interpretation.
Id. (citing H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1084, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1978), reprinted in 1978
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 9,453, 9,486 (emphasis added)).
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol3/iss1/11
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approval, ' 49 intended to codify the 1978 regulations. 0 This is
the only piece of legislative history the court found useful. 51
The district court cited several provisions of the ESA to
support its finding of an overall international concern in the
ESA. The court first looked to section 2 wherein the United
States pledges itself to conserve, to the extent practicable, wild-
life throughout the world.52 The court found further evidence of
an intent to apply section 7 to federal actions abroad in: (1) sec-
tion 3(6), which does not limit the definition of "endangered
species" to those found only within the United States;53 (2) sec-
tion 8, which specifically deals with "international cooperation"
regarding endangered species; 54 and (3) section 9(a), which pro-
hibits various actions, wherever occurring, by anyone subject to
the jurisdiction of the United States.55 Continuing the compari-
son with section 9, the district court reasoned:
[C]ongress knew that not all portions of the ESA were to apply
worldwide. Where they did not want the prohibitions to have ef-
,9 Defenders of Wildlife v. Hodel, 707 F. Supp. 1082, 1086 (D. Minn. 1989).
Id.
" Id. at 1085.
" The district court reasoned:
The court has made this determination well aware . ..that congressional intent
to apply a statute extraterritorially must go beyond the use of inclusive language.
The court finds that additional intent in several places. First, Congress' concern
with the international aspects of the endangered species problem is unmistakable
and appears repeatedly throughout the statute. Section 1531 states that the
United States has pledged itself to conserve, to the extent practicable, the wildlife
throughout the world.
Id. at 1085.
51 Id. "The term 'endangered species' means any species which is in danger of ex-
tinction throughout all or a significant portion of its range. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(6)
(1988).
54 Id. Section 8 is entitled "International Cooperation" and provides:
In order to carry out further the provisions of this chapter, the Secretary, through
the Secretary of State, shall encourage-
(1) foreign countries to provide for the conservation of fish or wildlife
and plants including endangered species and threatened species listed pur-
suant to section 1533 of this title;
(2) the entering into of bilateral or multilateral agreements with foreign
countries to provide for such conservation .
16 U.S.C. §§ 1537(b)(1), (2) (1988).
"5 Defenders of Wildlife v. Hodel, 707 F. Supp. 1082, 1085 (D. Minn. 1989). Section
9(a) provides: [Ilt is unlawful for any person subject to the jurisdiction of the United
states to-import any such species into, or export any such species from the United
States .. " 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(A) (1988).
1991]
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fect outside the United States, inclusive language was not used.
Section 1536's [section 7's] all-inclusive language, when con-
trasted with the discriminatory language of section 1538 [section
9], cannot be considered sloppiness on the part of Congress but,
rather, intentional language expressing a concern that the consul-
tation provisions be given effect wherever agency action took
place.5 6
Based on this analysis, the district court held that the 1986
regulations contradicted the ESA." The district court ordered
the Secretary to revoke and rescind that portion of the 1986 reg-
ulations that limited the consultation duty to agency actions in
the United States or on the high seas.58 Further, the Secretary
was ordered to publish regulations "clearly recognizing the full
mandate of section 7 . ..expressly and affirmatively requiring
that each federal agency consult with the defendant Secretary
with respect to any agency action that may affect any endan-
gered or threatened species, wherever found."" e
In response to this remand proceeding, the Secretary ap-
pealed to the Eighth Circuit a second time. 0 He again argued
that the district court erred in holding both that Defenders had
standing and that Congress intended for the ESA to apply to
United States agency projects carried out in foreign countries."
" Id. at 1085 (emphasis in original).
" Id. The court reasoned that:
The conference committee's "stamp of approval" of the worldwide scope of sec-
tion 7, in addition to the all-inclusive language of the statute and the international
concerns expressed throughout the ESA, leaves the court with the belief that the
intent of Congress is clear.
Congress intended that section 1536's consultation requirements were to ap-
ply to all actions, including those in foreign countries. It follows from this finding
that the 1986 regulations promulgated by the Secretary of the Interior which lim-
ited the application of the ESA to those activities occurring within the United
States or on the high seas are contrary to the ESA. Summary judgment will be
granted in favor of Defenders on that basis.
Id. at 1086.
11 Id. at 1086.
59 Id.
0 Defenders 11, 911 F.2d 117 (8th Cir. 1990).
"' Id. at 118.
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III. HOLDING OF THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT (Defenders II)
The issue before the Eighth Circuit in Defenders 1162 was
whether the 1986 regulations contradicted the ESA.63 The
Eighth Circuit held that the plain language and legislative and
regulatory history of the ESA demonstrated Congress' intent to
apply the consultation requirement of section 7 to federal
projects carried out in foreign countries." The court affirmed
the district court decision invalidating the relevant portion of
the 1986 regulations and ordering the Secretary to promulgate
new regulations that conform to the original 1978 version. 65
In reviewing the Secretary's interpretation of section 7, as
reflected in the 1986 regulations, the Eighth Circuit used the
standard of review for agency actions developed in Chevron
U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,"6 (Chevron stan-
dard). The Chevron standard is a two-part test. The first part
requires the court look to the plain meaning of the enabling
statute in question."7 If the statute unambiguously speaks to the
issue at hand, the court must defer to the plain meaning entirely
and assess whether the agency's action complied with the ex-
press statutory language. 8 If, however, the court determines
that the statute is silent or ambiguous on the issue, the court
must then proceed to the second part of the Chevron standard
and compare the regulatory history to the corresponding legisla-
tive history in order to determine whether the agency's interpre-
62 Defenders 11, 911 F.2d 117 (8th Cir. 1990).
e' Id. at 118. The issue of standing was also raised and resolved in favor of Defend-
ers. Id. at 122.
:4 Id. at 123.
5 Id. at 125. See also Defenders of Wildlife v. Hodel, 707 F. Supp. 1082, 1086 (D.
Minn. 1989).
" Id. at 122. See Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S.
837 (1984).
'7 The Chevron standard is a two-part test. The first part requires as follows:
When a court reviews an agency's construction of the statute which it administers,
it is confronted with two questions. First, always, is the question whether Con-
gress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress
is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must
give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.
Defenders 11, 911 F.2d 117, 122 (8th Cir. 1990) (quoting Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Re-
sources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984)).
68 Id.
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tation is based on a permissible construction of the statute. 9
A. The Plain Language of the ESA
In Defenders H, the Eighth Circuit analyzed section 7,
under the first part of the Chevron standard, to determine
whether the plain language of section 7 provided a clear expres-
sion of congressional intent to apply the consultation require-
ment to agency actions in foreign countries.7 0 Section 7 provides
in pertinent part:
Each Federal agency shall, in consultation with and with the as-
sistance of the Secretary, insure that any action authorized,
funded or carried out by such agency. . . is not likely to jeopard-
ize the continued existence of any endangered species or
threatened species or result in the destruction or adverse modifi-
cation of habitat of such species ... "
The court remarked on the all-inclusive language used in section
7, which "admits to no exceptions,""2 but recognized that the use
of all-inclusive language in one particular section of the ESA
does not demonstrate unambiguous congressional intent that
section 7 apply extraterritorially. 73 Thus far, the Eighth Circuit's
analysis did not differ from that of the district court.7
The court then searched the language of the ESA as a
whole, under the first part of the Chevron standard, for an un-
ambiguous expression of congressional intent. Relying on the
United States Supreme Court's extensive discussion of the
ESA's purpose in Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill,76 the
" The Eighth Circuit, quoting the Chevron standard, continued:
If, however, the court determines Congress has not directly addressed the precise
question at issue, the court does not simply impose its own construction on the
statute, as would be necessary in the absence of an administrative interpretation.
Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the
question for the court is whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible
construction of the statute.
Id.
"' Defenders II, 911 F.2d 117, 122 (8th Cir. 1990).
71 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (1988) (emphasis added).
" Defenders H, 911 F.2d at 122.
" Id. "We recognize, however, that the use of all-inclusive language in the particular
section of the Act is not determinative of the issue." Id.
"' See supra notes 43-47 and accompanying text.
75 437 U.S. 153, 184 (1978).
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Eighth Circuit recalled the Act's ambitious purpose: "[t]he plain
intent of Congress in enacting this statute was to halt and re-
verse the trend toward species extinction, whatever the cost.
This is reflected not only in the stated policies of the Act, but in
literally every section of the statute.' '7 ' The court then
presented a review of the ESA and identified the international
context in which Congress intended the act to function. 7 This
part of the court's analysis was also similar to that of the district
court, which identified an "overall international concern" in the
ESA.78 Concluding that congressional intent could be gleaned
from the express language of the ESA, the court held that it
owed no deference to the Secretary's contrary construction of
the act as found in the 1986 regulation.7 9 The court, reaffirming
its inherent authority to so decide, asserted that "the judiciary is
the final authority on issues of statutory construction and must
reject administrative constructions which are contrary to clear
congressional intent." 80
B. The Legislative and Regulatory History of Section 7
Having found the plain language of section 7 unambiguous
on the issue of whether section 7 applies to agency actions in
foreign countries, the Eighth Circuit could have ended its review
76 Defenders 11, 911 F.2d 117, 122 (8th Cir. 1990) (quoting Tennessee Valley Au-
thority v. Hill, 437 U.S. at 184 (1978) (emphasis in original)).
7 Judge Alsop relied on specific portions of the ESA, noting that Congress has de-
clared that the "United States has pledged itself as a sovereign state in the international
community to conserve to the extent practicable the various species of fish or wildlife
and plants facing extinction." Id. at 122 (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1531(a)(4) (1988)). The
ESA lists various international agreements that guide this pledge and declares that one
of the purposes of the ESA is to take appropriate steps to achieve the goals of the inter-
national treaties and conventions listed there. Id. at 122-23 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b)
(1988)). Further, the ESA defines "endangered species" broadly and without geographic
limitations. Id. at 123 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1532(6) (1988). The Secretary must determine
which species are endangered according to procedures in the ESA. These procedures are
not limited to domestic species and must take into account "those efforts, if any, being
made by any state or foreign nation . . . to protect such species .. " Id. at 123 (quot-
ing 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(1)(A) (1988)). The Secretary is also required to give actual notice
to and invite comment from each foreign nation in which species proposed for listing as
endangered are found. Id. at 123 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(5)(B) (1988)).
78 See supra notes 52-57 and accompanying text.
79 Defenders 11, 911 F.2d 117, 123 (8th Cir. 1990).
80 Id. at 123 (quoting Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467
U.S. 837, 843 n.9 (1984)).
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of the Secretary's 1986 regulations. Nevertheless, the court pro-
ceeded to the second part of the Chevron standard.8 1 The second
part of the test is triggered by statutes that are silent or ambigu-
ous on the issue that is the subject of agency regulation. This
examination was somewhat more detailed than that of the dis-
trict court.82 The Eighth Circuit concluded that the Secretary's
rationale for eliminating extraterritorial scope in 1986 was
poorly reasoned.8 3 In doing so, the court examined the history of
the original 1978 regulation, the amendment to the ESA that
occurred later in 1978, and compared these with subsequent reg-
ulatory changes in 1986 that made the ESA inapplicable to fed-
eral agencies' projects carried out in foreign countries.
The regulatory history of section 7 features two years of de-
bate and comment prior to the promulgation of the first final
regulations in 1978. After the initial rule making process began,
the former Secretary, Donald P. Hodel, solicited comments from
government agencies in April, 1976.84 The Army Corps of Engi-
neers, the State Department and the Defense Department were
opposed to the extraterritorial application of section 7.85 The
Council on Environmental Quality, the Interior Department So-
licitor's Office, and the General Counsel's Office for the National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration took the position that
the consultation duty extended to foreign countries."8
After having considered comments for two years, the Secre-
tary published the first final rule on January 4, 1978, providing
that: "Section 7 .. . requires every Federal agency to insure
that its activities or programs in the United States, upon the
high seas, and in foreign countries will not jeopardize the con-
tinued existence of a listed species. '87
The Eighth Circuit, like the district court, acknowledged
81 Id. at 123.
82 See supra notes 48-51 and accompanying text.
83 Defenders H, 911 F.2d 117, 124 (8th Cir. 1990).
84 Section 7 was interpreted for the first time in 1976 when the Fish and Wildlife
Service of the Department of Interior issued "guidelines" to assist agencies in complying.
As is customary, the initial guidelines were not binding upon agencies, however, their
scope did extend to agency activities affecting listed species in foreign countries. 42 Fed.
Reg. 4,868-69 (1977).
85 Defenders H, 911 F.2d 117, 123.
88 Id.
8743 Fed. Reg. 874 (1978) (codified at 50 C.F.R. Part 402) (emphasis added).
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this early regulatory history and then reviewed the amendments
to section 788 that were subsequently passed in November of
1978.89 The Conference Report on these amendments indicated
that no substantive changes were intended for the consultation
provisions of section 7:
The conferees adopted Senate language creating a new section
7(a), which essentially restates section 7 of existing law, and out-
lines the responsibilities of the Secretary and other Federal agen-
cies for protecting endangered species .... The Conferees felt
that the Senate provision by retaining existing law, was prefera-
ble since regulations governing section 7 are now familiar to
most Federal agencies and have received substantial judicial
interpretation.9
Because "existing law" included the 1978 regulations requiring
extraterritorial application, the Eighth Circuit held that the
above language was strong evidence of the Conference Commit-
tee's approval of the 1978 regulation.9 The extensive commen-
tary leading up to the 1978 rule making led the court to believe
that Congress was aware of the extraterritorial scope given to
the consultation provision in the 1978 regulation. 2
The Eighth Circuit then compared the pre-1978 commen-
tary on the regulations and the Conference Report on the 1978
amendments with the regulatory history of the 1986 regulation.9
Pub.L. 95-632, § 3, Nov. 10, 1978, 92 Stat. 3752. The amendments considerably
lengthened Section 7 by adding exemption provisions and empowering a new Endan-
gered Species Committee to grant them. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1536(e)-l (1988).
89 Defenders 1I, 911 F.2d 117, 124 (8th Cir. 1990). See also supra notes 47-50 and
accompanying text.
90 H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1084, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 9,453, 9,486 (emphasis added).
Defenders H, 911 F.2d 117, 124 (8th Cir. 1990).
The Secretary had argued before the Eighth Circuit that the court should be ex-
tremely hesitant to presume general congressional awareness of agency practices based
on "a few isolated statements in the thousands of pages of legislative documents." Id. at
124 (quoting Securities & Exchange Commission v. Sloan, 436 U.S. 103 (1978)). The
court distinguished the 1976-1978 regulatory history from one providing a few, isolated
statements, but did not further address this argument. Id.
" The court cited a 1983 notice of proposed rule making. It stated that this pro-
posed regulation "eliminated the need for consultation or foreign projects and defined
'action' to exclude foreign activities." Defenders II, 911 F.2d 117, 124 (8th Cir. 1990).
The 1983 proposed rule interprets section 7 as follows:
Section 7(a)(2) requires every Federal agency, in consultation with and with the
assistance of the Secretary, to insure that any action it authorizes, funds or carries
1991]
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The 1986 regulations eliminated consultation on foreign projects
and defined "action" (e.g. federal agency "action") to exclude
activities in foreign countries. 4 The Secretary attributed the
elimination of extraterritorial application to "the apparent do-
mestic orientation of the consultation and exemption processes
resulting from the [19781 amendments, and because of the po-
tential for interference with the sovereignty of foreign na-
tions."95 In the published explanation of the new rule, no evi-
dence was given to support this conclusion. 6 The description of
the final regulations adds:
although consultations on Federal actions in foreign countries will
not be conducted under this rule, the [Fish and Wildlife] Service
maintains its strong commitment to the preservation of species
and habitat worldwide. The Service will continue to list species
which are found outside of United States jurisdiction when they
are determined to be endangered or threatened.97
In assessing the Secretary's rationale, the Eighth Circuit ac-
knowledged that an administrative agency is not disqualified
out are not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any listed species or
result in the destruction or adverse modification of critical habitat.
48 Fed. Reg. 29,997 (1983). The proposed regulation also added a definition for the term
"action":
"[a]ction" means all activities of any kind authorized, funded, or carried out, in
whole or in part, by Federal agencies. Examples include, but are not limited to: (a)
the promulgation of regulations; (b) the granting of licenses, contracts, leases,
easements, rights-of-way, permits, or grants-in-aid; or (c) actions directly or indi-
rectly causing modifications to the land, water or air.
Id. at 29,998.
This proposed regulation eliminated the language in the 1978 rule that had applied
section 7 to agency actions "in the United States, upon the high seas, and in foreign
countries." 50 C.F.R. § 402 (1979). See supra note 16.
4 See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
" Defenders H, 911 F.2d 117, 124 (8th Cir. 1990) (citing Appellant's App. at 84). In
fact this language comes from the analysis of the 1986 rule in the Federal Register. The
"Section by Section Analysis" of the rule provides in full:
The 1978 rule extended the scope of section 7 beyond the territorial limits of the
United States to the high seas and foreign countries. The proposed [1983] rule cut
back the scope of section 7 to the United States, its territorial sea, and the outer
continental shelf, because of the apparent domestic orientation of the consultation
and exemption processes resulting from the Amendments, and because of the po-
tential for interference with the sovereignty of foreign nations.
51 Fed. Reg. 19,929 (1986).
" See generally 51 Fed. Reg. 19,926 (1986).
97 Id. at 19,930.
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from changing its mind,98 and that substantial deference is ap-
propriate if there appears to have been good reason for the
change.9 With regard to the 1986 regulation, however, the court
found that the Secretary's rationale fell "far short when ex-
amined in the context of the Act's language and legislative
history."100
The court addressed the Secretary's first argument that the
consultation requirement was domestically oriented. The Secre-
tary had supported this argument primarily by pointing to the
1978 amendments to section 7, which had created exemptions
from the consultation duty."0 ' The amended statute states that
exemptions will only be granted if "the action is of regional or
national significance. "102 Because granting exemptions requires
the weighing of public interests,1 03 the Secretary argued that
having one country weigh the public interests of another would
be a gross intrusion upon the sovereignty of foreign nations.10 4
The Eighth Circuit did not find this persuasive evidence of an
overall domestic orientation of the ESA or of the consultation
provision. The court asserted that the exemption provisions
were not necessarily domestic in scope. 0 5
The Secretary's second argument that section 7 is domesti-
98 Defenders II, 911 F.2d 117, 124 (8th Cir. 1990) (quoting NLRB v. Local Union
No. 103, Int'l Ass'n of Iron Workers, 434 U.S. 335, 351 (1978)).
9. Id. at 124, (citing Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332
(1989)).
100 Id. at 124.
0 Id. See, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1536 (e)- (1988).
102 16 U.S.C. § 1536(h)(1)(A)(iii).
03 Id. at § 1536(h)(1)(A)(ii).
04 Defenders H, 911 F.2d 117, 125 (8th Cir. 1990).
00 Id. at 125. The argument that the exemption provisions is domestic in scope was
asserted as follows. Applications for exemptions may be made by the Governor of the
state involved. 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (1988) ("the Governor of the State in which an agency
action will occur, if any . . . may apply to the Secretary for an exemption." Id. at §
1536(g)(1) (emphasis added); see also 16 U.S.C. § 1536(g)(2)(B)(1)(i). The Secretary ar-
gued that this language, which requires Governors to apply, implied that only domestic
projects were contemplated. Defenders 11, 911 F.2d 117, 125 (8th Cir. 1990). The court
rebutted this argument by emphasizing the qualifying language in that provision (i.e.,
"the Governor of the State in which an agency action will occur, if any...") to imply
that the action involved need not occur in one of American states. Id. The court con-
cluded: "Again, we are unpersuaded.... This language, when considered with the sub-
stantive and persuasive evidence previously discussed, leads us to conclude that the ex-
emption provisions do not limit the consultation requirement geographically." Id. at 125
(emphasis added).
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cally oriented referred to the treatment, in section 7(a)(2), of the
critical habitat provisions of section 4.106 The Secretary argued
that the critical habitat provisions in section 4 are domestic in
scope, that Congress would not have referred, in section 7(a)(2),
to both the critical habitat provisions and the consultation re-
quirement and expected each to have different reach; one do-
mestic and one extraterritorial. 107 The court, however, found the
critical habitat provisions of section 4 and the consultation pro-
visions of section 7, both of which are referred to in section
7(a)(2), to be severable because the designation of critical habi-
tats is governed by different procedures and standards than the
listing of endangered species.010
After discussing the exemption and critical habitat provi-
sions, the court did not address any of the other provisions of
the ESA that, according to the Secretary, revealed congressional
intent to apply section 7 only to domestic federal agency
projects. The court simply concluded: "We have carefully con-
sidered these arguments and believe that they do not compel a
different result here. They merit no further discussion. ' 19
Lastly, to support his argument that section 7 is domesti-
cally oriented, the Secretary relied heavily on the canon of statu-
tory construction that statutes are presumed to have domestic
scope only.110 To overcome the presumption that a statute is do-
mestic in scope, there must be clear expression of such congres-
sional intent."' This presumption was adopted and applied by
the district court and by the Eighth Circuit. 12 Both courts re-
butted the presumption by finding such express intent in the
plain language of the ESA.11
106 Defenders 1I, 911 F.2d 117, 124 (8th Cir. 1990).
107 Id.
"I0 Id. at 124-25. Compare 16 U.S.C. §§ 1533(b)(1)(A)-(B) (indicating how endan-
gered species are to be identified) with 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2) (indicating how critical
habitats are to be designated).
'1 Defenders 1I, 911 F.2d at 125.
o Id. at 125 (citing Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281 at 285 (1948)). The pre-
sumption that statutes are domestic in scope was relied upon and rebutted by the dis-
trict court. See infra text accompanying notes 43-47. This analysis is contrasted with the
Eighth Circuit's analysis, which primarily reviews the scope of regulatory agencies' au-
thority to interpret their enabling legislation through the regulations they promulgate.
. Id. (citing United States v. Mitchell, 553 F.2d at 1003 (5th Cir. 1977)).
..2 See supra notes 43, 44 and accompanying text.
113 See, id.; Defenders 11, 911 F.2d at 125.
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After concluding that the ESA is not domestically oriented,
the Eighth Circuit analyzed the second aspect of the Secretary's
rationale for the 1986 regulation. The discussion of the 1986 reg-
ulations published in the Federal Register alleges that the extra-
territorial reach of the 1978 regulations would potentially inter-
fere with the sovereignty of other countries.1"' This interference,
it was argued, would adversely impact on foreign relations."15
The Eighth Circuit disposed of this claim in a brief paragraph.
Rather than interfering with the sovereign right of foreign na-
tions to strike their own balance between development and envi-
ronmental conservation, the court reasserted that section 7 is di-
rected only at the actions of United States federal agencies." 6
The court remarked that Congress remains free to amend the
ESA and restrict the scope of the consultation clause if congres-
sional concern for foreign relations (e.g. an alleged interference
with the sovereignty of another nation) outweighs its concern for
wildlife." 7 The court, however, would not make such a decision
on Congress' behalf."'
Based on the foregoing analysis, the court concluded that
Congress intended the ESA consultation requirement to apply
to agency projects in foreign nations, as well as to projects in the
United States or on the high seas."19
Defenders I, 911 F.2d at 125. See 51 Fed. Reg. 19,929 (1986).
"' Defenders II, 911 F.2d at 125. See 51 Fed. Reg. 19,929 (1986).
li Defenders H, 911 F.2d at 125.
17 The court reasserts the limitation on the judiciary to decide statutory policy is-
sues stating:
The Secretary also expresses concerns about the impact on foreign relations stem-
ming from extraterritorial application of the consultation duty. It urges that such
a construction would be viewed as an intrusion upon the sovereign right of foreign
nations to strike their own balance between development of natural resources and
protection of endangered species. We note initially that the act is directed at the
actions of federal agencies, and not at the actions of sovereign nations. Congress
may decide that its concern for foreign relations outweighs its concern for foreign
wildlife; we, however, will not make such a decision on its behalf.
Id. at 125.
18 Id.
" Id.
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IV. ANALYSIS
A. Analysis of the Eighth Circuit's Holding
The Eighth Circuit analyzed the 1986 regulations under
both parts of the Chevron analysis even though it found a suffi-
cient basis for striking the pertinent portion of the regulations
under the first part alone. While the court takes a definitive
stand, its holding rests upon the uncertainties that accompany
analyses of legislative and regulatory histories. The United
States Supreme Court will presumably engage in the same pro-
cess, consult the same histories, and draw its own conclusions.
An examination of regulatory history, compared to that of
legislative history, is particularly difficult because comments on
proposed regulations are largely unpublished. Without a daily
verbatim transcription, such as the Congressional Record, forays
into regulatory history entail behind-the-scenes inquiries into
comment letters received by the promulgating agency. In this
case, it is never made entirely clear whether the court is review-
ing the rationale offered at the time the 1986 regulations were
promulgated or whether the court entertained new and addi-
tional arguments posed by the Secretary during the court
proceedings.
If agencies are not held accountable for their reasoning at
the time of rule making, ad hoc justifications may be added after
the fact. The Chevron mandate for rational rule making thereby
becomes one for rational retrospective justifications.
These obstacles are inherent in any attempt to glean either
congressional intent or agency reasoning from their respective
documented histories. The district court restricted its ventures
into these waters while the Eighth Circuit waded waist-high.
Both court opinions selected the arguments they found most
compelling from the items of documented history brought before
them. As environmental statutory provisions are litigated, this
selection process will differ from court to court.
Essentially, it was the plain, all-inclusive language of section
7 that persuaded both the district court and the Eighth Circuit.
It is arguable that many of the other provisions of the ESA and
its history are sufficiently general if not vague to permit hot de-
bate as to the scope Congress intended to give the ESA.
Absolute statutory mandates for conservation combined
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with vague terms in the more procedural provisions of the ESA
have required the courts to rummage through the regulatory and
legislative histories in hopes of finding a clearly stated indication
of the rationale that lies behind section 7's all-inclusive lan-
guage. It may be argued that the statutory language reflects un-
resolved questions regarding the priority Congress and the Exec-
utive sought to place on the worldwide conservation of
endangered species. During the 1970s, while the absolute terms
of the ESA had yet to be challenged, crucial questions about the
rationale behind the act could lie dormant. It has been argued
that the 1978 amendments, which provided a committee to de-
cide upon exemptions, represent the first attempt to lessen the
broad mandate to save all species. 120 When legislative exemp-
tions became possible, the "spirit," not just the letter, of the Act
came under scrutiny and it became necessary to ask which appli-
cations of the general rule that all species must be protected
were most important.1 2 ' The 1986 regulations to section 7,
promulgated by the Secretary, may be viewed as a second at-
tempt to loosen the absolute statutory mandates of the ESA.
These regulations, which eliminated federal agency liability for
the harm agencies cause to endangered species abroad, came
from the Department of Interior, an arm of the Executive. The
United States Supreme Court will determine whether or not
these regulations will be upheld.
In addition to the exemption provisions, and an attempt to
amend the scope of section 7 in the 1986 regulations, day-to-day
implementation has revealed that simply to decree that all spe-
cies are to be saved does not automatically ensure that they will
be, in the face of shortages of appropriations and a failure of
initiative by agencies.122 Faced with inevitable priority choices,
the remaining question is whether these priority decisions will
be made according to a rationally discussed and consensually
adopted foreign policy, supported by the Executive, or whether
they will be left to whim or chance. The development of the
ESA and other federal environmental statutes, and the lack of
compliance with section 7 in particular may largely be due an
120 See NORTON, WHY PRESERVE NATURAL VARIETY? 3-6 (1987).
"21 Id.
122 Id.
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inconsistent environmental foreign policy articulated by the
Executive.
B. Comparing ESA Section 7 with NEPA Section 102(2)(F)
A comparison of ESA section 7 with a similar provision in
the National Environmental Policy Act1 23 (NEPA) reveals the
lack of a coherent, consensual, federal foreign policy toward en-
vironmental conservation that can systematically be applied to
United States actions in foreign countries. NEPA was enacted in
1969, just four years before the ESA,1 24 and requires every fed-
eral agency to include a detailed environmental impact state-
ment (EIS) in proposals for major federal actions significantly
affecting the environment."2 5
1. NEPA
NEPA section 102(2)(F) imposes requirements on federal
agency actions that take place in foreign countries. It provides:
[A]1 agencies of the Federal Government shall ... recognize the
worldwide and long-range character of environmental problems
and, where consistent with the foreign policy of the United
States, lend appropriate support to initiatives, resolutions, and
programs designed to maximize international cooperation in an-
ticipating and preventing a decline in the quality of mankind's
world environment.
126
"I National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, § 101, 102(2)(F), 42 U.S.C. § 4321,
4332(2)(F) (1988).
224 See supra note 11.
"s The lynch pin of NEPA is found in section 102(2)(C), which requires the prepa-
ration of environmental impact statements (EISs):
The Congress authorizes and directs that, to the fullest extent possible . . . all
agencies of the Federal Government shall. . . include in every recommendation or
report on proposals for legislation and other major Federal actions significantly
affecting the quality of the human environment, a detailed statement by the re-
sponsible official on the environmental impact of the proposed action ...
42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1988). The section goes on to require consultation regarding the
potential adverse environmental impacts that a particular project may cause: "Prior to
making any detailed statement, the responsible Federal official shall consult with and
obtain the comments of any Federal agency which has jurisdiction by law or special ex-
pertise with respect to any environmental impact involved." Id. Compare with supra
note 30 (provides the language of section 7 of the ESA).
120 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(F) (1988) (emphasis added).
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During NEPA's twenty-year history, arguments against the
application of section 102(2)(F) to United States' actions abroad
have been raised and resolved in favor of an extraterritorial in-
terpretation on a case-by-case basis. 27 Reading the 1986 regula-
tions to ESA section 7 in pari materia with NEPA section
102(2)(F) reveals a fundamental inconsistency in the Executive's
position regarding the United States duty to conserve the global
environment. This inconsistency produces confusion within fed-
eral agencies and permits continued decimation of endangered
species abroad. A comparison with NEPA also demonstrates
that the State Department is the most critical player in the
long-term effectiveness of either provision.
An examination of the case law interpreting the application
of NEPA to United States actions abroad reveals that a case-by-
case analysis will be applied under section 102(2)(F). 118 Under
these cases, an EIS need not be prepared for federal actions
abroad if it would impede United States foreign policy."2 9 The
legislative history of NEPA offers little clarification of Congres-
sional intent with regard to section 102(2)(F), which has been a
part of NEPA from its inception in 1969.130 In 1979, President
Carter responded to litigation that granted extraterritorial scope
to NEPA by issuing Executive Order 12114.'13 This order re-
quires the use of an environmental impact assessment for: (1)
"major Federal actions significantly affecting the environment of
the global commons outside the jurisdiction of any nation (e.g.,
the oceans of Antarctica); 1 32 (2) when an action will affect a
"' See, e.g., infra note 128.
128 See NRDC v. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 647 F.2d 1345 (D.C. Cir. 1981);
Sierra Club v. Morton, 510 F.2d 813 (5th Cir. 1975); Sierra Club v. Coleman, 405 F.
Supp. 53, and 421 F. Supp. 63 (D.C. 1980); National Organization for the Reform of
Marijuana Laws v. Department of State, 452 F. Supp. 1226 (D.C. 1978).
1%9 Id.
,3° National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 853
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4331, 4332(2)(F) (1988)). Because the preparation
of an environmental impact statement (EIS) under NEPA requires a period of public
comment, foreign policy regarding United States national security could be impaired by
requiring an EIS for sensitive agency projects abroad. See supra note 125 for the text of
the NEPA provision requiring the preparation of EISs.
131 44 Fed. Reg. 1,957 (1979).
132 Exec. Order No. 12114, 32 C.F.R. 197 (1991), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 4332 app.
at 978-79 (1988).
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third or otherwise uninvolved nation;3 3 (3) when an action is
strictly regulated in the United states (e.g. actions involving ra-
dioactive materials or toxic substances);13 4 or (4) when the Presi-
dent or Secretary of State designates a natural or ecological re-
source to be of global importance.' 35
2. The ESA and NEPA
In contrast to NEPA, the duty to perform a section 7 con-
sultation does not depend upon whether a particular project, on
a case-by-case basis, would interfere with foreign policy (e.g. na-
tional security). Rather, the Secretary of the Interior's 1986 reg-
ulations eliminated the duty to perform section 7 consultations
on projects conducted abroad by promulgating the 1986 regula-
tions. This was done with the support of the Executive via the
State Department. 36 The Secretary's justification was not that
consultation could cause possible, situation-dependent interfer-
ence with foreign policy, as was the case in the NEPA analysis.
Instead, the justification was that there would be a necessary in-
terference with the foreign sovereignty of any nation where an
agency project was conducted. 31
The 1978 exemption provisions to the ESA offered the first
signal that day-to-day implementation of absolute statutory
mandates to conserve all species was impracticable and unsup-
ported by subsequent sessions of Congress. The second signal
was the Secretary's promulgation of the 1986 regulations which
eliminated the extraterritorial scope of the consultation provi-
sions; it stemmed from the Executive. Looking beyond the ESA
to NEPA, an environmental statute that is similarly broad in its
mandate and which provides a corresponding exception based on
foreign policy, reveals an arguable pattern. When absolute, stat-
utory mandates, which are designed to preserve all endangered
species or to assess any and all projected environmental harm
associated with federal projects, prove to be either impracticable
133 Id. at 978.
134 Id.
135 Id.
" See supra notes 84-86 for reference to the State Department's opposition to the
extraterritorial application of section 7.
131 See supra notes 94-95 and accompanying text.
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or insufficiently supported by the Executive, an ad hoc response
of amendment, regulation and court deliberation may result.
The role of the courts, and currently that of the United States
Supreme Court, becomes that of preventing the uncoordinated
or sporadic attempts from entirely evading the spirit and intent
of the agencies' enabling legislation, assuming the intent or ra-
tionale has been articulated by Congress.
Until the United States Executive, largely through the State
Department, decides upon the rationale for and the priority to
be given to environmental conservation abroad, and until it con-
structs a coherent foreign policy to embrace this rationale, fur-
ther statutory and regulatory amendments and judicial interven-
tion will create the equivalent of the United States
environmental foreign policy, but in an inconsistent fashion. If a
cohesive environmental foreign policy were articulated, regula-
tions and statutes could be amended to more uniformly reflect a
more measured and systematically applied approach.
3. Compliance With ESA Section 7 and NEPA Section
102(2)(F) to Date
Regarding the implementation of section 7, no consultations
have been completed since 1973 with regard to federal agency
actions abroad. 13 8 The federal agencies most frequently involved
in projects abroad are the Army Corps of Engineers and the
Agency for International Development (AID).13 9 Although one
consultation was initiated in 1978 with regard to the Aswan dam
"'8 Telephone interview with Ralph Swanson, Section 7 Coordinator, Federal Activi-
ties Branch, Habitat Conservation Division, Fish & Wildlife Enhancement Program,
FWS (Feb. 28, 1990).
Telephone interview with Christine Enright, Section 7 coordinator, FWS (Feb.
26, 1990). The agencies that most frequently complete section 7 consultations regarding
domestic projects are the Bureau of Land Reclamation, whose projects usually involve
the construction of dams and water delivery systems in the western states; the Bureau of
Land Management, whose projects primarily involve mining, rasing and timbering activi-
ties west of the Rocky Mountains; the Army Corps of Engineers, whose projects fre-
quently involve public lands, including mining, timbering and water diversion projects in
the eastern states; the Environmental Protection Agency, which finances a variety of
projects that require consultation through various environmental statutory grant pro-
grams; the Forest Service; and the Military. FWS targets these agencies for special atten-
tion to compliance with section 7 because of the scope of their activities. However, these
and other agencies conduct projects abroad and all of them should be consulting with the
Secretary pursuant to section 7. Id.
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in Sri Lanka, no final jeopardy opinion was filed.1 0 After publi-
cation of the 1978 regulation, the State Department notified the
FWS that it disapproved. The State Department asserted that
"an analysis [i.e. section 7 consultation] by a United States
agency of the impacts on endangered and threatened species in,
and policy options available to, foreign countries may be per-
ceived by them as an unwarranted interference in matters
within their jurisdiction. 1 4 1
Instead of implementing the 1978 regulations and complet-
ing a section 7 consultation regarding the water diversion project
in Sri Lanka, the State Department and the Agency for Interna-
tional Development (AID) worked informally with FWS to ob-
tain advice regarding endangered species protection.4 2 The ra-
tionale for this decision to terminate the section 7 consultation
was that AID ended the federal agency "action" by completing
its loan to Sri Lanka for the project in 1977, prior to the promul-
gation of the 1978 regulations requiring section 7 consultations
for federal agency actions in foreign countries. 4 3
This single attempt to apply section 7 to a United States
agency project abroad is symptomatic of what may be called the
larger illness. Implementation of broad statutory mandates with-
out an articulated environmental foreign policy and without Ex-
ecutive support for the legislative mandates will be sporadic or
contrived at best.
Although NEPA sections 102(2)(C) and (F) apply to major
federal actions abroad, this provision has fallen into a similar
pattern of disuse. For example, many agencies do not have the
mandated implementing regulations required under its terms. 1 4
In part this is because the Department of State resists incorpo-
rating unilateral environmental impact assessment into its for-
eign policy agenda.1 5
140 Id.
M' Letter from Patsy T. Mink, Assistant Secretary of State to Mr. Kieth Schreiner,
Associate Director, FWS, April 28, 1978.
'4' Letter from Robert S. Cook, Deputy Director, FWS, to John J. Gilligan, Depart-
ment of State, July 27, 1978) (discussing applicability of section 7 to the Mahaweli
Ganga Development Project, Sri Lanka).
143 Id.
144 See N. Robinson, Environmental Impact Assessment Abroad 17 (September 22,
1989) (unpublished manuscript available from the Pace University School of Law).
14 Id. One assessment of the United States' environmental foreign policy posits
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Clear support from the Executive branch would foster com-
pliance with the general language of the environmental statutes
imposing liability on federal agencies for their actions in foreign
countries. Inertia can continue so long as a policy that supports,
motivates or directs compliance is lacking.
C. International Law and Defenders II
According to an emerging body of general international
principles, the United States is under a duty to protect biologi-
cal diversity worldwide. " " In the "Findings" section of the En-
dangered Species Act, the United States imposes a duty upon
itself, as a nation in the international neighborhood, to conserve
that:
Since 1969, the content of U.S. environmental foreign policy has been modest and
imprecise. Where treaties create express obligations, as in the Convention on the
International Trade in Endangered Species (citation omitted], the policy can be
clear .... For most foreign policy questions, however, environmental protection
has been subject to countervailing tendencies, and the inertia of past policies in
the State Department and other foreign affairs agencies has tended to restrict ad-
vancing new environmental protection positions [citations omitted]. Most of these
past policies were framed with scant attention to trends in environmental
degradation.
Id. at 17.
146 Principle 2 of the 1973 Declaration of the United Nations Conference of the
Human Environment provides: "[t]he natural resources of the earth, including the ...
flora and fauna and especially representative samples of natural ecosystems, must be
safeguarded for the benefit of present and future generations through careful planning or
management, as appropriate." Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the
Human Environment, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 48/14/Rev. 1 (U.N. Pub. E.73.Il.A.14) (1973),
reprinted in 11 I.L.M. 1416 (1973). Principle 21 further declares:
States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the princi-
ples of international law, the sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursu-
ant to their own environmental policies, and the responsibility to ensure that ac-
tivities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the
environment of other states or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.
Id.
These principles on behalf of biological diversity are taken a step further in the 1982
United Nations World Charter for Nature. This Charter begins by setting out general
principles, the second of which relates to the conservation of biological diversity: "the
genetic viability on the earth shall not be compromised; the population levels of all life
forms . . . must be at least sufficient for their survival, and to this end necessary habi-
tats shall be safeguarded." In section III, the Charter goes beyond the statement of inter-
national principles and provides for implementation and action: "Itihe principles set
forth in the present Charter shall be reflected in the law and practice of each
State. UN World Charter for Nature, G.A. Res. 37/7, GAOR Supp. (no.51) at 17
(1982).
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species that are threatened with extinction. 47 The Eighth Cir-
cuit, in ordering the reinstatement of extraterritorial scope for
section 7, implements the international agreements to which the
United States has pledged its support.
In addition to responding to the emerging body of interna-
tional law on the preservation of biological diversity, federal pro-
visions that apply to United States foreign countries are more
easily enforced than international environmental legal provi-
sions. First, using federal statutes as one means of addressing
foreign or transnational conservation mechanisms permits litiga-
tion in the United States court system. Judgments for relief are
obtainable in the federal courts and are binding and enforceable
against United States agencies. Second, those federal statutes
that contain citizen suit provisions eliminate the need to wait for
governmental intervention and minimize the standing require-
ments that must be met before relief can be sought. 48
In contrast, the enforcement of international legal mecha-
nisms is necessarily slow-paced and less certain. Complainants
must either pursue the process of establishing an international
arbitral tribunall'4 or initiate proceedings in the International
Court of Justice. Before either of these processes may proceed,
however, the complainant's government must first choose to ad-
vocate the complainant's environmental cause. 50 Then, the for-
eign defendant country must agree to submit to the jurisdiction
147 The ESA provides:
The United States has pledged itself as a sovereign state in the international com-
munity to conserve to the extent practicable the various species of fish or wildlife
and plants facing extinction, pursuant to-
(C) the Convention on Nature Protection and Wildlife Preservation in the West-
ern Hemisphere; . . . and
(G) other international agreements.
16 U.S.C. § 1531(4) (1988).
148 The ESA contains a citizen suit provision at 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g). NEPA does not
have a citizen suit provision.
" ' See, e.g., Trail Smelter Arbitration (US v Canada), 3 R.Int'l Arb. Awards 1905
(1941).
. 150 See 1. PAENSON, MANUAL OF THE TERMINOLOGY OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 572-
89 (1983) (Chapter VIII sets forth the general procedures used in the judicial, quasi-
judicial and nonjudicial resolution of international disputes.)
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of the designated court or tribunal.'51
In addition, securing the payment of international settle-
ments or judgments by the prevailing government to the injured
nationals is less certain than securing federal judgments. More-
over, political negotiation between sovereigns may not proceed
swiftly enough to prevent further environmental injury. Difficul-
ties in agreeing on international standards and even in merely
exchanging data on damage and treatment costs further com-
pound the capacity of the United States and a foreign sovereign
to give timely attention to ongoing environmental harm caused
by American projects. 5 ' Consequently, when complainants are
limited to international mechanisms for redressing transnational
environmental harm, inaction becomes the rule and effective in-
ternational legal mechanisms tend to be limited to those which
are instituted to cope with catastrophe. 5 '
In addition to expediting legal action and the payment of
settlements, federal statutes that affect the international com-
munity serve as examples to other countries. Other nations may
develop similar domestic provisions that hold their nationals re-
sponsible for the transnational environmental degradation they
cause. 5' As the number of countries with such statutes grows,
consensus on well-defined issues of environmental protection
and enforcement can develop and lead to treaties that codify a
unified approach. 55
CONCLUSION
Defenders of Wildlife v. Lujan acknowledges and upholds
Is' Id.
... Boxer, The American Environmental Law System: A Model for Transnational
Action, 1 BROOKLYN J INT'L L 18 at 21 (1975), (paraphrasing Bleicher, An Overview of
International Environmental Regulation, 2 ECOLOGY. L.Q. 1, 31-51 (1951)).
"' It has been noted that:
[t]he dangers of a slow, piecemeal approach is that it is likely to leave us, in the
words of a United States Government memorandum, one convention behind the
next major pollution disaster, not only because of the slow process of drafting and
signing a large number of conventions, but because of the inevitable delays in
ratification.
Id. at 21 (quoting Bleicher, An Overview of International Environmental Regulation, 2
ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 31-51 (1951)).
I" See N. Robinson, Environmental Impact Assessment Abroad 17 (September 22,
1989) (unpublished manuscript available from the Pace University School of Law).
156 Id.
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the broad mandate of the ESA as enacted by Congress. The
Eighth Circuit honored Congress' express, all-inclusive language
and thereby laid to rest an attempt to promote an agency's
agenda over the spirit of its enabling legislation. The United
States Supreme Court is reviewing this decision.
Unresolved issues remain. Although the Eighth Circuit de-
cided in favor of extraterritorial application, this is primarily be-
cause of the all-inclusive language of section 7 and not because
the other provisions of the ESA or its legislative or regulatory
history leave no doubt. While the United States Supreme
Court's decision will be binding, using the courts to decide, in
effect, upon the United State's environmental foreign policy ar-
guably pushes the judiciary beyond the task of statutory con-
struction. Unless the United States articulates a consensual, ra-
tional environmental foreign policy that can be systematically
applied, the courts will continue to run interference between the
mandates of absolute statutory language and the impracticabil-
ity of those mandates and/or the lack of subsequent Congres-
sional and Executive support suffered by these mandates. Be-
cause such a policy is lacking, compliance with section 7
regarding United States agency actions in foreign countries re-
mains all but nonexistent. Until the State Department embraces
international environmental conservation as a priority tenet of
United States foreign policy, the ESA and other environmental
statutes will not have the legal teeth their language gives them,
whether or not the courts uphold the broad statutory mandates.
Without such a policy, in the case of section 7, the decimation of
biological diversity caused by United States agency actions in
foreign countries continues, ironically, along-side the imperative
statutory language designed to reduce it.
Carol Conyers
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